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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE W. FLICK,

*

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
GLEN VAN TASSELL and VAN'S SERVICE,
INC., a Utah corporation,

*
*

Case No.

*

14154

*

Defendants and Appellants.
*

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover monies advanced by the Plaintiff
to the Defendants.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judgment was entered for the Plaintiff on April 2, 197 5,
against the Defendants, jointly and severally.
taken from the judgment.

Appeal was not

The Defendants appeal from an adverse

decision upon their motion under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
60(b)(1) to set aside the judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendants request that the Court reverse the trial judge,
that the Court dismiss the judgment against Van's Service or
reduce the amount of the judgment. None of these forms of relief

-1-
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are within the jurisdiction of the Court in this matter, because
no appeal was taken timely from the judgment entered herein.

The

relief available to the Defendants on this motion is limited
solely to a review of the exercise of the trial Court's discretion
denying the motion of the Defendants under Rule 60(b).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was filed in December of 1973.

(R-l) An appear-

ance was duly entered for the Defendants by Boyd M. Fullmer, who
continued to represent the Defendants as counsel of record until
March 19, 1975, (R-159), at which time he was permitted to withdraw.

The record shows that Mr. Fullmer participated in depositions

and other discovery; that he appeared in opposition to motions of
the Plaintiff and that he was personally involved as counsel at
every stage of the preceedings, including pretrials, up to the
date set for the trial in the matter below.

(R-l to R-160)

On

February 28, 1975, Plaintiff notified Defendant of the impending
trial date and because Plaintiff had heard that Defendants were
replacing their counsel, the notice requested Defendants to get
new counsel prior to the trial.

(R-149, R-150)

On March 4,

1975, Mr, Fullmer requested permission from Judge Thornley Swan
at a hearing on a motion filed by Mr. Fullmer for permission to
withdraw as counsel for Defendants.

Then or shortly thereafter,

Mr, Fullmer filed a written motion for permission to withdraw.
(R-152).

Judge Swan advised Mr. Fullmer that the motion to

withdraw would be denied if it meant that a continuance of the
trial date would be necessary.

Based on the March 4, hearing,
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a written order was issued by the Court, of which Mr. Fullmer
had due notice, ordering that the trial proceed on March 19, and
giving the Defendants until March 14, to respond to certain
interrogatories and requests for admissions served upon them
months earlier by the Plaintiff.

(R-155).

No responses to the

interrogatories have ever been tendered by the Defendants and
the requests for admissions were deemed admitted on March 14,
for the failure of Defendants to respond.

(R-160 et seq.).

At the trial, Plaintiff appeared with his counsel and Boyd M.
Fullmer appeared for the sole purpose of withdrawingf although
he was still counsel of record for the Defendants.

Fullmer

stated in open Court that he no longer had the file and didn't
want to try the case from memory.
1975, hereinafter Trial Tr. at 3).

(Transcript of Trial, March 19,
He stated that Glen Van

Tassell and his replacement counsel, J. Reed Tuft, were fully
aware of the trial setting for that morning, and that Tuft may
have reviewed the file as early as the 28th of February, 1975.
(Trial Tr. 3).

Mr. Fullmer then withdrew from the courtroom and

the Plaintiff put on his evidence, leading ultimately to a
judgment for the Plaintiff against the Defendants jointly and
severally, entered April 2, 1975. The time for appeal from the
judgment ran on May 2, 1975, and was not extended by a motion
under Rules 52 or 59.

(R-178).

J* Reed Tuft, who had filed a motion for permission to appear
prior to the trial, filed a motion under Rule 60(b) to vacate the
April 2, judgment.

(R-180).

The grounds alleged in the said

-3-
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motion were as follows: Defendant, Van Tassell, had business
interests outside of the state, which led to communication problems
between himself and his attorney, and to dissatisfaction on the
part of Van Tassell with the services of Boyd Fullmer; Fullmer
sought to withdraw unsuccessfully and Tuft, Van Tassell's replacement counsel, refused to appear until Fullmer was released; therefore Van Tassell was allegedly without counsel at the March 19,
hearing; Tuft had not been familiar with the file on March 19,
but at the time of the Rule 60(b) hearing, he was ready to proceed; and Van Tassell had an unspecified defense.
At the hearing on the motion under Rule 60(b), held April
24, 1975, the trial court heard evidence regarding further grounds,
(Transcript of April 24, 1975, hearing, hereinafter Tr. of Apr.
24 hearing).

Van Tassell testified that although he was not

fully aware of the differences between a trial and a pretrail,
Fullmer had stated that the March 19 hearing was a pretrial and
the Van tassell need not attend.

Van Tassell also testified,

however, that Fullmer had told him that the March 19, hearing
was a trial.

(Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 13).

Fullmer testified,

in turnf that he doubted he had told Van Tassell that the hearing
was a pre-trial.

Fullmer stated that he had told Van Tassell

prior to the hearing that he would do nothing more at the trial
hearing than appear and withdraw.

Fullmer further testified

that the order on the hearing of March 4, would have been forwarded to his clients as part of his usual practice to forward
all orders when received.

Fullmer testified that Van Tassell had
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notice and full understanding of the requests for admissions and
unanswered interrogatories prior to March 14, and with time to
respond,

(Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 19-28).

Based on the testimony and the record, the Court denied the
Rule 60(b) motion by memorandum decision entered on the 15th day
of May, 1975*

The Court signed an order on its memorandum

opinion on June 10, 1975, and this appeal was commenced by notice
filed June 19, 1975, by Boyd M. Fullmer, who again represents
Defendants as their counsel on this appeal.
POINT ONE
The Court Should Dismiss all of Defendants Appeal Except
That Part Pertaining to the Denial of Defendant1s Motion Under
Rule 60(b).

|

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 73(a) provides as follows:
"When an appeal is permitted from a district court to the
Supreme Court, the time within which an appeal may be taken
shall be one month....
The running of the time for appeal
is terminated by a timely motion made pursuant to any of the
rules hereinafter enumerated, and the full time for appeal
fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is to be
computed from the entry in the minutes of any of the following orders made upon a timely motion under such rules:
granting or denying a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b),
or granting or denying a motion under Rule 52(b) to amend or
make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration
of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted?
or granting or denying a motion under Rule 59 to alter or
amend the judgment; or denying a motion for a new trial under
Rule 59".
Notice of appeal is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of
the reviewing court.

In the case of In re Estate of Ratliff,

19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967), this court held it had no
jurisdiction because appellant had failed to tender the fee for
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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filing the notice of appeal within a month after judgment.
Furthermore, no relief from failure of appellant to file his
appeal on time may be granted under Rule 6(b) which permits
extension of time in general on the ground of excusable neglect,
or under Rule 60(b) which applies to relief from judgments on
the gound of excusable neglect. Anderson vs. Anderson, 3 Utah
2d 277, 280, 282 P.2d 845, 847 (1955).

See generally Galanis vs.

Mayes, 16 Utah 2d 181, 397 P.2d 998 (1965).
Judgment was entered below on April 2, 1975, (R-178), and the
Notice of Appeal bears the filing stamp of the Davis County Clerk
of June 19, 1975, 78 days later.

(R-237).

Clearly Defendants

failed to appeal from the judgment and thereby lost that portion
of their appeal.

To hold otherwise would give the trial court

power to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court after appellate jurisdiction has been lost. £f. Holbrook vs. Hodson, 24 Utah
2d 120, 123, 466 P.2d 843 (1970).
Defendants P ra Y for relief pertaining to the merits of the
judgment below, yet it is clear that Rule 60(b) is no substitute
for appeal.

(Meadows vs. Cohen, 409 F.2d 750, 752, (5th Cir. 1969);

Schildhaus vs. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 531 (2d Cir. 1964); McDowell vs.
Celebrezze, 310 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1962); Well-Mixed, Inc. vs.
City of Anchorage, 471 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1970).

The reason for

this rule was stated in Horace vs. St. Louis Southwestern Railroad
Co., 489 F.2d 632, 633 (8th Cir. 1974) where appellants had allowed
the time for appeal to run and later appealed from a denial of
Rule 60(b) motion as follows:
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"Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial judge and is not available as a substitute for appeal...
It provides for extraordinary relief which may be granted
only upon an adequate showing of execeptionalcircumstances..."
489 F.2d at 633.
Therefore, although the Defendants seek modification or
reversal of the judgment entered April 2, 1975, herein they are
entitled to neither form of relief, because appeal from an order
denying a Rule 60(b) motion brings up only the order and not
the judgment,

Lee vs. Brown, 210 Kan. 168, 499 P.2d 1076 (1972)?

Neagle vs. Brooks, 203 Kan. 323, 454, P.2d 544 (1969).
POINT TWO
The Defendants made No Attack on the Merits of the Judgment
Entered Herein at the Time of Their Motion Under Rule 60(b), and
Their Contentions Attacking the Judgment Should Not Be Reviewed
On This Appeal.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which is patterned
after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), provides extraordinary relief from a judgment.

Like all motions, however, it

is limited by the provisions of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7,
which requires that grounds for a motion be stated with particulari
in the motion.

The purpose for this requirement is to create a

record upon which a decision may be made, and if a party deems it
advisable, to appeal from the decision on the record.

Under

familiar principles, the record made in the written motion may
also include matters heard in evidence pursuant to Rule 43.
The record on which the Defendants1 Motion for Relief
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Pursuant to Rules 55 and 60(b) is based is expressed in the
written motion and the transcript of the hearing on the motion.
Contentions outside of this record were not before the trial
court below when he ruled on the Defendants1 Rule 60(b) motion
and should hot be a bisis for appeal here.
Several recent Utah Supreme Court decisions present reasoning which sheds light on the principles governing matters raised
for the first time on appeal.

Dallof vs. Robinson, 520 P.2d 191

(Utah 1974) was an appeal in which the appellant claimed for the
first time on appeal that the judgment was barred by the workman's
compensation statute.

In Patton vs. Lloyd, 28 Utah 2d 57, 497

P.2d 1382 (1972), appellants claimed for the first time on appeal
that their attorney below had acted unethically.

The jury found

for the defense in Simpson vs. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d
301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970) and on appeal for the first time appellant demanded that the principle of strict liability apply to the
case*

In all of thes cases the court refused to review the new

matter on appeal.

In Simpson, the Court reasoned as follows:

"The contention relating to strict liability is an attempt
to inject that doctrine into this case for the first time
on appeal* It was dealt with neither in the plaintiff's
complaint, nor in the pretrial conference, nor at the trial.
It is therefore not appropriate to address, such a contention
to this court. Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is
the final settlement of controversies, requires that a
party must present his entire case and his theory or theories
of recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he cannot
thereafter change to some different theory and thus attempt
to keep in motion a merry-go-round of litigation".
24 Utah 2d 301 at 303.
WasatchMines Co. vs. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007 (1970)

-8-
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was a case where the defendant had failed to properly plead
the statute of limitations, and thus could not have review of
his contentions based on limitations.

And the failure to make a

proper record below was relied on by the court in American Oil
Co. vs. General Contracting Corp., 17 Utah 2d 2d 330, 411 P.2d
46 (1966) to refuse review of matters wholly foreign to the record
on appeal because not mentioned in the pleadings nor in the findings of the court below and not raised by motion to amend the
memorandum decision of the court below nor by request for findings.
There is one exception to the principle set down in the
above cases, arising from In Re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384
P.2d 110 (1963), in which the court decided, over a vigorous
dissent/ that if the liberty of the appellant is jeopardized
then constitutional issues not heard below may be raised on appeal.
That case has no application to this appeal.
Defendants demand that the judgment be reduced in amount or
modified as to Van's Service, Inc.

These contentions are wholly

foreign to the record in their Rule 60(b) proceedings and should
not serve as a basis for review on this appeal.
POINT THREE
The record justifies the trial court's denial of Defendants'
Rule 60(b)(1) Motion.
This court considered a denial of a Rule 60(b) (1) motion in
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. vs. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d
429 (1973) and stated that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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A:
"The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of
discretion in granting or denying a motion to relieve a
party from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), U. R. C. P.,
and this court will reverse the trial court only where an
abuse of this discretion is clearly established".
(footnote
omitted)
30 Utah 2d 65 at 67,

The court reasoned as follows in sustaining

the denial:
"For this court to overturn the discretion of the lower
court in refusing to vacate a valid judgment, the requirements of public policy demand more than a mere statement *
that a person did not have his day in court when full
opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded to him or his
legal representative.
The movant must show that he has
used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing
by circumstances over which he had no control". (Emphasis
in the original. Footnote omitted) 30 Utah 2d 65 at 68.
With respect ot he due diligence of the Defendants, the records
show the following:
(a)

Defendant Glen Van Tassell, failed to appear twice at

his duly scheduled and noticed deposition, and was only induced
to appear under threat of sanctions from the court pursuant to
Rule 37.

(R-4, R-8, R-ll, R-13, R-18, and R-21).

When he did

appear, he failed to produce documents listed in Requests for
Production incorporated in the Notices of Deposition, to which
he never responded.
(b)

(R-36, 37).

In June, 1974, Plaintiff served Interrogatories upon

Glen Van Tassell.

(R-38)

These were not answered for various

insufficient reasons and were the subject of orders, beginning
September 30, 1974 (R-74).

Defendant was ordered to answer

again on December 19, 1974, (R-120).

No written answers to any

of these interrogatories were ever served.

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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(c)

On October .17, 1974, Plaintiff served requests of

admisssions on Defendant.

(R-79 through R-89).

The time for

defendant to respond to these requests was extended by the Order
of December 19, and again by the Order of March 10.
R-153).

(R-120,

The time for responding ran prior to the trial date of

March 1 9 , 1975.

No response to any of the requests was ever made,

and pursuant to the March 10, 1975, order the requests were
deemed admitted at the time of trial.

No motion has been filed

for relief from the effect of these admissions, and therefore
the

Defendant Glen Van Tassell is bound by them.

Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure 36.
(d)

Plaintiff heard a rumor late in February, 1975, that

Boyd M. Fullmer was about to withdraw as counsel for Defendants.
Therefore, on February 28, 1975, a notice was served on Mr.
Fullmer and by mail to the last known address of Glen Van Tassell,
urging the defendant to obtain new counsel in time for the trial
scheduled herein for March 19, 1975.

(R-149, R-150).

Mr. Fullmer

did request permission to withdraw a few days later, which request
was denied by Judge Swan.
and 24)•

(R-181)(Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 23,

On march 17, 1975, J. Reed Tuft served a Petition to

Appear as Counsel for the defendants, by ordinary mail.

The petition

was expressly contingent on the granting of Fullmer1s petition to
withdraw.

(R-156).

Tuft's position was tantamount to a refusal

to go ahead on March 19 as ordered, because Judge Swan had stated
that Fullmer had to stay on the case if his withdrawal would necessitate a continuance.

Tuft did not ask for a continuance, in order

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to prepare for the trial, nor did he later attack the jdugment
entered as a result of the March 19, hearing oh the merits, by
motion for new trial or to amend the judgment or findings.
(e)

Plaintiff made repeated motions for sanctions against

the Defendant for his failure to discover.
R-155)

(R-36, R-66, R-102,

A detailed Memorandum was filed by Plaintiff supporting

these Motions.

(R-104 through 112).

The court took the matter

under advisement from time to time, but at the trial ultimately
granted relief in part as a response to these motions,
newed at the trial,
(f)

duly re-

(R-160, 161).

The trial date was duly set by court order, served upon

Defendant's counsel of record, and mailed notice was sent to
defendant personally,

(R-146, R-149, R-150).

Notice was given

before Fullmer had formally requested leave to withdraw, and no
reasons are given why defendant should not be bound by this
notice.

Defendant claimed at the April 24, hearing on the Rule

60(b)(1) motion that he had not realized the importance of the
March 19, date, (Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 1 6 ) , but Fullmer
claimed that he had given notice of the trial setting to his
client and had warned that he would again attempt to withdraw.
(Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 21, 25 and 28). The trial court's
finding with respect to this evidence is reflected in his Memorandum Decision of May 13, 1975, as follows:
"This matter was set for trial for March 19, 1975, by Judge
Swan. Defendant was advised March 19, was a "firm setting".
Defendant was aware of this setting and of Judge Swan's
order.
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"...Further, the defendant was advised by his counsel,
Mr. Fullmer, what would happen if he did not appear".
(R-216)
(g) Boyd M. Fullmer, who was allegedly discharged by Van
Tassell and whose attempted withdrawal from this case occasioned
Van Tassell's claim that relief should be granted under Rule
60(b)(1), is now again counsel for defendants, raising an inference
perhaps that the differences between him and Van Tassell which
originally led to the attempted withdrawal were not as deep-seated
as alleged in Defendants' motion under Rule 60(b) (1).
at paragraphs four and five).

(R-181

Mr. Fullmer's lack of care is no

ground for relief under Rule 60(b) (1).

Hoffman vs. Celebrezze,

405 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1969) (Government lawyer allowed judgment
against United States for interest and later attacked it under
Rule 60(b)(1) on the Ground he hadn't realized that the type of
claim was non-interest bearing).
In the fact of the record, as set out above, Defendant Glen
Van Tassell has set out to show that he exercised due diligence
and that judgment was entered because of factors beyond his
control, as he must under Airkem Intermountain Inc. vs. Parker,
supra; Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 420, 260 P.2d
741 (1953); and Peterson vs. Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860
(1905).

The court below made the following findings in its

Memorandum Decision at R-216:
"The facts of this case do not establish excusable neglect
but rather an attitude of non-participation on the part of
the defendant....The defendant had his day in Court and the
judgment was rendered after a hearing despite defendant's
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non-participation. Ends of justice are not served if a party
may obtain delay and frustrate the proceedings of the Court
by simply failing to prepare and failing to appear".
Glen Van Tassell's conduct was like that of the appellant in
Pacer Sport & Cycle

Inc. vs. Myers, 534 P.2d 616 (Utah 1975),

who had told plaintiff's counsel that he had sued the wrong defendant and then taken no further action.

Such conduct does not

approach reasonable neglect, as the court held in Myers.
The cases cited by Defendants in their brief are not to the
contrary*

Security Adjustment Bureau, Inc. vs. West, 20 Utah

2d 292, 437 P.2d 214 (1968) was a case where punitive damages
had been assessed without evidence and the defendant claimed he
had received no notice of the motion for entry of default.

In

the present matter, the Defendants made no attack on the merits
of the judgment in their Rule 60(b) (1) motion, and the trial
judge found, as recited above, that defendants had notice of the
proceeding.

Chrysler vs. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 303 P.2d

995 (1956), cited by Defendants for the benefit of some favorable
dicta, is an affirmance of a denial of a Rule 60(b) (1) motion
from a judgment entered in a hearing at which the defendant
chose not to participate, despite due notice to his counsel.
The Chrysler case lends support to the ruling below, by the
following passage:
"It is claimed the plaintiff did not personally receive
notice of the trial date until...the same morning....
Even if true, this circumstance would appear to be quite
immaterial. His attorney had notice, and plaintiff's
conduct there was entirely inconsistent with any bona
fide intention to pursue this action in Utah".
5 Utah 2d 415 at 417
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d
951 (1962), does not support the Defendants' position, because it
was a default judgment entered prior to any proceedings, on the
basis of the failure of the defendant to file an answer, and set
aside at the behest of the stockholders of the defendant company,
who had no actual notice of the matter.

No similar claims are

made herein by either Defendant.
Another case cited by Defendants, McKean vs. Mountain View
Memorial Estates, 17 Utah 2d 323, 411 P.2d 129 (1966), was a
default entered because counsel had been 27 minutes late to a
trial of which he had received only two days notice.

Counsel was

anxious to proceed when he arrived but the court had entered a
default and would not hear him with respect to the issue of
liability.

Below, however, counsel voluntarily left the proceed-

ings, having made no motion for continuance, stating that it would
be a disservice to his client to try the matter without the file.
The trial herein had been noticed up by regular notice and sub-*
sequent court order and the trial date had been a matter of
negotiation for some time before that.
Russo vs. Aucoin, 7 So.2d 744 (La. App. 1942) was a lower
appeal

court decision in Louisiana.

It is difficult to assess

its relevance because it was decided under a different jurispurdence than our own common law and rules modeled after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Nevertheless it is pertinent to show

that Defendants have apparently not published the deposition cited
by them in their brief, referring to the Russo case, and the
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deposition testimony of.Plaintiff with respect to that matter
is by no means as clear as Defendants argue in their brief.
Furthermore, this matter was explored at the March 19, 1975,
hearing.

Findings of Fact 2, 3, 9, 15, 53, 54 (R-160 et seq.)

and Plaintiff's Exhibit "D".

(R-158).

v

Defendants have failed to explain why they discharged their
counsel practically upon the eve of trial and failed to have an
authorized representative at the trial, after due notice of the
trial date.

Defendant Van Tassell1s verified motion states:

"That prior to moving his residence to Idaho, the defendant
Glen Van Tassell was required to devote so much personal
attention to the ranching operations in Idaho that he was
required to be away from his home in Utah (where his business
records were situated) for extensive periods of time, and
was for long periods of time unable to be reached by phone".
(R-180).
The rule is stated by 46 Am.Jur. 2d Judgments, §718 as follows:
"Parties are not justified in neglecting their cased merely
because of the stress or importance of their own private
business, and such neglect is ordinarily not excusable",
(footnotes omitted).
The Verified Motion of Van Tassell admits neglect of the
inexcusable variety.

The Court below properly refused to grant

the relief he requested.
POINT FOUR
Defendants Did Not Move For a Continuance of the March 19,
Trial Date and Should Therefore Not Be Heard To Complain About
the Judgment Entered Thereon.
A major underpinning of Defendants1 argument on appeal is
the holding of Finch vs. Wallberg Dredgind Co., 281 P.2d 136

-16-
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(Idaho 1955) where counsel refused to try the case and replacement
counsel, with short notice, sought a continuance.

In the case

below, however, replacement counsel, apparently with notice of
at least two weeks, (Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 19) made no
effort to salvage the situation in a timely manner.

The court

in Brunson vs. Hamilton Ridge Lumber Corp., 122 S.C. 436, 115
S.E. 624 (1923), reasoned as follows:
"If a party to the action can force a continuance by the
willful discharge of his attorney just before the time for
trial, and then secure a continuance, there would be no
way in which the trial of a case can be forced".
No continuance can be reasonably expected where the court
specifically rules that in case of a withdrawal there will be no
continuance and orders the attorney to go forward, as occurred
in the present case.

Slaughter vs. Zimman, 105 Cal. App. 2d

623, 234 P.2d 94 (1951).

(Defendant failed without reasonable

excuse to obtain counsel after permitting his attorney to withdraw after notice that no continuance would be allowed).
Where the Defendant hired a new attorney five days before
trial and then sought a continuance at trial, the court in
Flynn vs. Fink, 60 Cal. App. 670, 213 Pac. 716 (1923), reasoned:
"parties litigant have no absolute right to insist upon a
change of counsel at the last moment before the time set
for the commencement of the trial, where such change of
counsel requires a continuance in order that the case may
be properly prepared for trial. Such a course, if permitted
and if persisted in, might and probably would in many cases
work the destruction of private rights of the opposing
litigant and would be subversive of the 'prompt administration
and execution of the laws, upon which depends largely their
effectiveness'".
If the Court proceeds with the trial on the date set in the
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absence of defendants and no proper motion for continuance is
before the court, there is no error in denying a continuance.
Nahas vs. Nahas, 135 Cal. App. 2d 440, 287 P.2d 381 (1955).

In

Nahas counsel had made a motion for a continuance when the case ,.,.-•
was called.

The motion was not supported by affidavits required

by statue. No evidence was presented for defendants.

Judgment

was rendered on the evidence, as in the case at bar, and sustained
against the attack upon the denial of the continuance.
In ruling against a continuance, it is deemed relevant that
the defendant may have had a prior continuance.
85 Nev. 705, 463 P.2d 482 (1969).

Dodd vs. Cowgill,

Defendant obtained a contin-

uance herein to postpone the trial from March 12, 1975, to
March 19, 1975, on the ground that his then counsel, Mr. Fullmer,
had a conflicting court appointment on March 12.

(R-138, R-146)

See generally Benson vs. Benson, 66 Nev. 94, 204 P.2d 316
(19 49) (inability of new counsel to prepare no ground for continuance where party and attorney could have prepared for trial by
exercise of reasonable diligence).
POINT FIVE
The Default Entered on the Ground of Failure to Answer
Interrogatories Should be Sustained.
Plaintiff served certain interrogatories in June, 1974, to
which Defendants never responded.

At the time of trial Plaintiffls

motion for Default judgment under Rule 37, which had been pending
since March 4, 1975, was called up for a hearing before the trial
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judge, A lengthy memorandum already on file supports said motion.
Defendants have never shown any good cause for failing to answer
the interrogatories.

An inference ought to be drawn that the

answers, if made, would support the entry of judgment.

See

Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co. vs. Carrier, 426 S.W.2d 938 (Kentucky).
(Trial date set one day after answers were due; motion for extension of time denied 16 days previously; trial date had been
requested eight months previously).

Plaintiff requested a trail

date July 12, 19 74, a little more than eight months before the
trial date.
POINT SIX
No Relief Should Be Granted to the Corporate Defendant on
This Appeal.
No deficiencies in the judgment against the corporate
Defendant were raised in \::oe Rule 60(b)(1) proceedings below, and
therefore as argued previously the Court should not entertain such
issues on this appeal.

upon the withdrawal of Boyd M. Fullmer

at the trial, default was entered against the corporation, and
judgment was entered under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55.
Defendants make no objection to any of these procedures and did
not appeal timely from them.

Airkem International, Inc. vs.

Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973) supports the entry
of default under these circumstances.
Furthermore, the record shows that Van Tassell used the
corporation as part of his scheme to get money from Plaintiff,

-19-
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(Tr. of Mar. 19, 1915,

hearing at 5, 6, 7 & 8) Van Tassell had

control of the books and records of the corporation, (Trial Tr. 8)
he controlled the issuance of stock therein, (Trial Tr. 8) and
that Van Tassell dealt with property in the name of the corporation.

(Trial Tr. 20, 21)

These factors show that the court

did not abuse its power under Rule 55 to enter judgment against
the corporation.

'•:•>-.•.

r

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully urges the Court to sustain the trial
court, on the ground that Defendants have failed to prove due
diligence or extenuating circumstances supporting their claim
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) (1), thus failing to
show an abuse of discretion below, and have failed to appeal in
time from the judgment

i file herein, tbns losing the opportunity

to challenge the merits of that judgment on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

Bruce Findlay
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD & GOTTFREDS
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff - Responded
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SERVED two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief by Mail on this
day of November, 1975, addressed t o —
BOYD M. FULLMER
Attorney at Law
540 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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